S YMPOSIUM: S EXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY, & THE CONSTITUTION

SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS, IMMUTABILITY, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
Michael Gentithes *
Immutability is an important thread in equal protection
jurisprudence. 1 It helps explain when a government classification is
constitutionally suspect, requiring courts to evaluate that classification
under the exacting strict scrutiny standard. 2 Recently the Supreme Court,
though not expressly relying on equal protection arguments to reach its
holding, has suggested that sexual orientation is an immutable trait of the
sort that traditionally triggers strict scrutiny when the government relies
upon it. 3 But the suggestion that sexual orientation is immutable, and thus
subject to strict scrutiny, has not found wide acceptance across the
judiciary. Furthermore, the scientific evidence surrounding sexual
orientation is far more subtle and nuanced than a simple dichotomy
between “immutable” on one hand and “malleable” on the other might
suggest. 4
LGBTQ advocates may be tempted to seize on the Supreme Court’s
language to make equal protection arguments based upon strict scrutiny,
especially in a political climate where courts appear likely to accept a wide
range of rational bases for LGBTQ discrimination. But claims that focus
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1. See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 14-16 (2015).
2. See Michael Gentithes, The Equal Protection Clause and Immutability: The Characteristics
of Suspect Classifications, 40 U. MEM. L. R EV. 507 (2010).
3. “[P]sychiatrists and others [have] recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 661 (2015).
4. See, e.g., Lisa M. Diamond & Clifford J. Rosky, Scrutinizing Immutability: Research on
Sexual Orientation and U.S. Legal Advocacy for Sexual Minorities, 53 J. S EX R ES. 363, 1-2 (2016)
(“Scientific research does not indicate that sexual orientation is uniformly biologically determined at
birth or that patterns of same-sex and other-sex attractions remain fixed over the life course.”).
*
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on immutability are too rigid. Those arguments assume that most
characteristics, including sexual orientation, can be classified in one of
two binary categories—either immutable or malleable. When that
assumption is applied to sexual orientation, it often unintentionally
demeans same-sex attraction as an inferior trait that must be explained
away. 5 It also puts the LGBTQ community in the awkward position of
suggesting binary classification of all traits is possible, including sexual
identities that the community has long recognized as far more fluid than
traditionally thought. Furthermore, the assumption that there is a binary
immutable-malleable divide between human characteristics ignores one
crucial insight hidden within immutability theory: that government should
not classify individuals based upon characteristics for which they bear no
moral responsibility, whether or not that characteristic can actually shift
over the course of an individual’s life. A renewed focus on that kind of
responsibility may be a more useful foundation for arguments in favor of
LGBTQ rights than immutability, as traditionally understood.
** ***
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads
that no state “shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” 6 One strand of equal protection theory holds that
classifications based upon a select set of specific criteria are
“constitutionally suspect” and therefore subject to “the most rigid
scrutiny.” 7 In an early articulation of the suspect classification doctrine,
Justice Hugo Black wrote that “[a]ll legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect . . . [and]
[c]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.” 8 Such
classifications have very little chance of withstanding constitutional
review under the Court’s harsh strict scrutiny standard. 9
5. See, e.g., Diamond & Rosky, supra note 4, at 31.
6. U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. R EV. 1, 1 (1976) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
8. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). In addition to the suspect
classification strand of equal protection thought, there is a parallel “fundamental rights” theory, which
holds that the clause is triggered if a law impacts a specific set of rights granted to all. See, e.g., Owen
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 P HIL. & P UB. AFF. 107, 113 (1976).
9. The standard has famously been called “strict in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. R EV. 1, 8 (1972); see also Richard Fallon, The
Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. R EV. 54, 79
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But what exactly constitutes a suspect classification? The text of the
amendment itself suggests protection of “persons,” 10 which would call
into question innumerable legal classifications between citizens necessary
for the government to function. After all, any classification between
persons seems dubious, or at least legally questionable, under the text of
the Fourteenth Amendment. But surely the government must make some
classifications that distinguish between people for society to function.
Without any such distinctions, it would be impossible for the government
to distribute goods and services in an orderly fashion.
Perhaps suspect classifications are those that generate particularly
invidious subordination in society. Justice Black’s formulation, and
theoretical work by Professor Owen Fiss, suggested that classifications
are suspect if they subordinate discrete “groups” that are distinct,
interdependent, and have traditionally been saddled with lower status in
society for some extended period of time. 11 This “anti-subordination”
theory asks judges evaluating government classification to determine
which groups have faced sufficient historical disadvantage such that
future classifications based upon status in those groups are
constitutionally suspect. 12 Anti-subordination theory acknowledges the
need to consider whether historical discrimination will continue in the
future, 13 even if historical discrimination helps identify which
classifications are suspect and worthy of more searching judicial review.
It also suggests that groups are only entitled to strict scrutiny protection if
they are unable to rely upon ordinary political processes to influence
government decision-making. 14
I have previously argued for a vision of suspect classifications that
focuses on the immutability of the traits the government uses to classify. 15
In other words, the government generally should not classify on the basis
(1997) (“‘strict in theory’ will routinely prove ‘fatal in fact”‘).
10. U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Fiss, supra note 8, at 147-50; see also Symposium, The Origins and Fate of
Antisubordination Theory, ISSUES IN LEGAL S CHOLARSHIP, vol. 2, issue 1 (Aug. 2002),
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ils/2/1/html?lang=en.
12. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. R EV. 1, 52 (1976).
13. See Fiss, supra note 8, at 151 n.67.
14. On this basis, Justice Scalia argued in dissent in United States v. Virginia that gender-based
discrimination might only be subject to rational basis review, given that women are a majority of the
electorate capable of advancing their interests through the ordinary political process. 518 U.S. 515,
575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Though certainly the LGBTQ community has expanded is political
voice in recent years, it seems far less clear that it can advance it interests through the ordinary
political process such that no form of heightened scrutiny is appropriate.
15. Gentithes, supra note 2, at 519-31.
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of attributes which are beyond any individual’s control. 16 Such
characteristics are not readily alterable by choice, 17 regardless of whether
there is some recognized history of discrimination on that basis. 18 Some
government distinctions based upon “immutable” traits—say, clear
eyesight for licensed drivers—may still seem appropriate. Classifications
based upon eyesight may not be suspect (or may withstand strict scrutiny,
even if suspect) because they rely upon something inherent in eyesight
itself—the ability to see clearly while operating a potentially dangerous
machine. But classifications based upon eyesight may be suspect (or may
withstand strict scrutiny) if not related to something inherent about
vision—say, a classification that denies certain forms of government
largesse to those with worse eyesight, simply because of the assumption
that nearsighted citizens are worthy of less respect or dignity. 19
Classifications based upon immutable characteristics in that way are
particularly invidious. 20
This seems to suggest, in unnecessarily rigid terms, that immutability
should be the singular qualification for suspect status in equal protection
jurisprudence. But reevaluating that immutability theory reveals a key
insight that can expand the legal understanding of suspect classifications.
The discussion of immutable characteristics above reveals, in part, that a
lack of moral responsibility—one facet of immutable characteristics—is
what makes classifications so suspicious. Early Supreme Court
discussions of immutability, such as 1973’s Frontiero v. Richardson,
highlighted “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility.” 21 Perhaps what
arouses suspicion in classifications based upon immutable characteristics
is the lack of responsibility for such characteristics. The immutability
discussion merely shows that classifications based upon traits for which
we are not responsible are far more likely to violate fundamental notions
16. Id. at 519-20.
17. Id. at 522.
18. Id. at 522-23.
19. Such classifications “fail to categorize persons on the basis of something inherent in the
very characteristic used to implement the governmental scheme.” Id. at 528. In a similar vein, John
Rawls’s “difference principle” posits that distinctions based upon natural characteristics should only
be permissible when they benefit all members of society, including those who occupy the least
advantageous positions on the social ladder. See JOHN R AWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65-68 (rev. ed.
1999).
20. Strict scrutiny might still have a role to play in smoking out illicit purposes for
classifications that otherwise seem to accrue to society’s general benefit. See Gentithes, supra note 2,
at 534-38.
21. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)); see also Diamond & Rosky, supra note 4, at 16-17.
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of fairness when the government distributes burdens and benefits. They
are thus far more likely to violate equal protection.
To show the relationship between responsibility and immutability, it
is helpful to reconceive arguments that classifications are suspect when
based upon immutable characteristics into a straightforward categorical
syllogism:
Major Premise: It is unfair (and likely unconstitutional) to disadvantage
someone because of characteristics for which they are not morally
responsible.
Minor Premise: Immutable characteristics are ones for which nobody is
morally responsible.
Conclusion: It is unfair (and likely unconstitutional) to disadvantage
someone because of immutable characteristics.

As this syllogism demonstrates, it is not the unchangeable nature of an
immutable characteristic itself that makes classification, and possible
discrimination, on that basis so troubling. Instead, immutable
characteristics classifications are suspect because they bear no
relationship to individual moral responsibility, as the major premise in the
syllogism above provides. That may be in part because of their
unchangeable nature, but it is not impossible that other characteristics
might similarly be ones for which individuals are not morally responsible
irrespective of their malleability. Immutable characteristics, as mere
“accidents of birth,” 22 do not generate any moral responsibility that would
be appropriate to rely upon to make government classifications. But other
characteristics might similarly fail to generate moral responsibility and
might similarly be inappropriate grounds for government classification.
Immutable characteristics are generally unchangeable, at least not
without great pain or effort. That permanence is often the focus of
discussion of immutability in legal arguments, where LGBTQ advocates
suggest that sexual orientation is fixed and biologically-determined trait. 23
But perhaps more importantly, immutable characteristics are traits for
which nobody can be held morally accountable. 24 That lack of
22. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
23. “For more than 50 years, opponents of the rights of sexual minorities have argued that samesex relationships represent deviant lifestyle choices that should be socially discouraged, and advocates
for sexual minorities have countered by arguing that sexual orientation is a fixed, biologically based
trait that cannot be chosen or changed.” Diamond & Rosky, supra note 4, at 3.
24. As Jessica Clarke has noted, immutability theory has both a forward-looking aspect, which
focuses on the individual’s inability to change the characteristic, and a backward-looking aspect,
which focuses on the individual’s lack of responsibility for the characteristic. Clarke, supra note 1, at
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responsibility is what makes discrimination on the basis of such
characteristics so abhorrent.
Casting immutability arguments in these syllogistic terms reveals
that immutable characteristics are just an example of factors for which
nobody can be considered responsible. They may not be the only ones.
Perhaps they are just the most clearly and easily demonstrated traits for
which nobody is morally responsible because they are also
unchangeable. 25 But perhaps some characteristics that are not entirely
unchangeable are also not subject to claims of moral responsibility,
despite having more fluidity in their expression than purely immutable
characteristics. If so, it would remain abhorrent to classify individuals on
the basis of those slightly more malleable traits. If individuals had no
moral responsibility for the characteristic, even if it could be altered with
slightly less effort or pain than traditional immutable characteristics, it
might still be suspect for the government to create classifications on the
basis of that characteristic.
** ***
LGBTQ advocates raising equal protection claims have several
options. First, advocates could focus their arguments on rationality, rather
than attempting to change the level of scrutiny applied to classifications
based upon sexual orientation or other gender identity characteristics. As
I noted above, classifications appear particularly invidious unless the
distinctions they draw are related to something inherent in the trait or
group—clear eyesight for licensed drivers, in my example. That clear
relationship seems exceedingly unlikely, and largely based upon
unfounded assumptions, when classifications are based upon LGBTQ
status or characteristics. Being LGBTQ does not affect an individual’s
abilities or needs in any meaningful way, especially in a manner that
would be an appropriate grounds for distributing government benefits and
burdens. Arguments that gay behavior is inherently immoral, undermines
20. The latter aspect is the focus of my discussion here.
The Supreme Court has noted this relationship between immutability and lack of responsibility
in cases involving non-marital and non-citizen children. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (noting children’s lack of responsibility for undocumented
immigration status).
25. So conceived, immutability would not be a necessary condition for a court to consider a
classification suspect. See Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness Arguments About Lesbian,
Gay, and Bisexual Rights, 89 C HI . KENT L. R EV. 597, 627 (2014).
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community values, or improperly influences children or others could be
directly challenged as irrational phobias that cannot survive even rational
basis review. 26
But the argument that LGBTQ classifications are irrational comes
with risks, however. Rational basis review itself may be a flawed
mechanism to meaningfully check abhorrent classifications, allowing
them to survive on the thinnest reeds of justification. The current political
climate, as well as the makeup of the judiciary and the Supreme Court,
might counsel against simply accepting rational basis review as the
appropriate standard of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny all but guarantees
protection; rational basis review comes with significant risk that it will be
applied in a watered-down manner that favors government classification
even on dubious justifications. Proving that sexual orientation and gender
identity are worthy of strict scrutiny would be a logically, and perhaps
politically, clearer route to greater constitutional protection.
LGBTQ advocates drawn to a strict scrutiny argument might believe
that immutability arguments hold the most promise. If there is a direct
parallel between sexual orientation or gender identity on the one hand,
and race on the other, then classifications based upon sexual orientation
and gender identity should be viewed just as skeptically as racial
classifications. But LGBTQ advocates should be wary of making that
strong immutability claim for several reasons.
First, it is not scientifically accurate to suggest that sexual orientation
is a uniformly unchangeable trait, over which individuals entirely lack any
choice or control. As Lisa Diamond and Clifford Rosky have carefully
documented, the scientific evidence suggests far more fluidity in sexual
attraction over time. 27 The evidence also shows that, although same-sex
attraction may have some biological influences, it is far from clear that
genetics alone controls sexual orientation. 28
Second, arguments based upon immutability—even if that term
focuses less on malleability and more on the centrality of the trait to how
an individual defines their personhood, as some courts’ discussions of
immutability have defined the term29 —suggest that same-sex attraction is
26. For examples of how such arguments might be framed, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
644, 665-76 (2015); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-36 (1996); United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744, 769-75 (2013).
27. Diamond & Rosky, supra note 4, at 5-11 (2016). Diamond and Rosky note that “the
simplistic notion of ‘choice’ wielded in public debates over sexual orientation does not do justice to
the complex, variable, and multidimensional nature of sexual desire as it is manifested in the mind,
brain, and body.” Id. at 14.
28. Id.
29. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1988) (Norris, J., concurring)
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an inferior or abnormal condition for which individuals must have some
kind of excuse. 30 The subordination of sexual orientation as a trait
individuals should cover up or apologize for may be just as abhorrent and
damaging as a government classification that is made on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity.
Instead, LGBTQ advocates might argue that immutable
characteristics are both unchangeable and sit at one extreme end of a
responsibility continuum. They are the exemplar of a trait for which most
of us have no moral responsibility because we cannot select our
immutable traits and we generally cannot alter them. 31 At the other end of
the responsibility continuum would sit pure choices, defined as
completely voluntary decisions that are fully within an individual’s
control. The individual bears clear and total responsibility for such pure
choices. Viewed as a dichotomy, immutable characteristics classifications
should always be suspect, while classifications based upon pure choices
should not.
But there is a vast middle between those two extreme ends of the
responsibility continuum. Perhaps some characteristics are more
malleable, and yet we bear similarly little moral responsibility for them
such that classification on their basis is suspect. Perhaps some
characteristics that can sometimes change, or at least are subject to far
more nuanced and subtle combinations of biological determination,
environmental influence, and conscious control, may still land near the
immutability end of the responsibility spectrum. Though such partiallymalleable traits are not “immutable” in the traditional sense, the law
should treat them similarly to other traits for which we bear no moral
responsibility. They are not subject to conscious choice and are

(“‘[I]mmutability’ may describe those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be
abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy
that change might be physically.”).
30. “A final and fatal weakness of immutability arguments for the rights of sexual minorities is
that these arguments boil down to large-scale apologies or excuses for same-sex sexuality.” Diamond
& Rosky, supra note 4, at 31. “The new immutability’s protections for ‘personhood’ exclude the most
stigmatized, and its underlying premises reinforce stereotypes.” Clarke, supra note 1, at 12. “[T]hese
theories are almost invariably couched in pejorative terms, such as abnormality, deficiency, [or]
aberration.” Stein, supra note 25, at 621.
31. One might also imagine that some traits exist on a continuum between wholly biologically
determined and wholly determined by choice, as Edward Stein has noted. “[I]magine a continuum
representing the contribution of biological factors to a trait: at one end is eye color and at the other
end is taste in music. The debate about the extent to which sexual orientation is biologically based is,
roughly, a debate about where sexual orientation falls on this continuum.” Stein, supra note 25, at
604.
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exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to consciously change. 32 They do
not trigger any moral responsibility on the part of the trait’s holder simply
for expressing that trait. Such traits, then, should still trigger strict scrutiny
when classifications are based upon them.
In cases involving same-sex attraction, LGBTQ advocates should
argue that the trait fits comfortably near the immutability extreme of the
responsibility continuum. What places those traits on that end of the
continuum is not just that these are difficult, if not impossible, traits to
change, even if that is true in the vast majority of cases. Instead, these are
not characteristics for which individuals are responsible, in any moral
sense. They are not negative traits that individuals should apologize for
through some appeal to irresistible biological compulsion—a
scientifically dubious and morally superfluous argument. Instead, even if
not wholly immutable at the time of one’s birth, these traits do not
generate moral desserts simply because an individual expresses them.
Thus, government classifications that distribute societal benefits and
burdens on the basis of those traits are suspect and should be reviewed
under strict scrutiny standards.
Such an argument for strict scrutiny might also allow advocates to
capitalize upon the intersectionality of LGBTQ characteristics with other
traits that have traditionally led to marginalization and oppression. As
those traits overlap—and as the experience of the LGBTQ community
becomes centered around intersections with categories traditionally
subject to strict scrutiny, like race or national origin—the argument for
strict scrutiny even if sexual orientation is not wholly fixed or biologically
determined becomes stronger still. Rather than ignore those overlaps,
advocates can emphasize the differences within the LGBTQ community
as a source of strength, providing greater protection against
discrimination. 33 Such intersectionality arguments could tip the balance
towards strict scrutiny.
** ***
When LGBTQ advocates raise equal protection arguments, they
should resist the temptation to make immutability claims. Instead, they
32. “The overwhelming evidence indicates that, for most people, sexual orientations are not
consciously chosen and are very difficult or impossible to change.” Id. at 611.
33. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 S TAN. L. R EV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (arguing that identity
politics often ignores powerful differences within groups, generating tension rather that emphasizing
these important intersections).
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should acknowledge greater flexibility in sexual orientation and gender
identity, thereby avoiding traditional and binary immutability theory, and
emphasize the lack of moral responsibility as a ground for strict scrutiny.
Such arguments may gain more traction in the years to come rather than
repeated efforts to suggest that sexuality is biologically determined,
unalterable, or both. Such arguments can also acknowledge the scientific
evidence that suggests greater variation in sexual orientation, shifting the
focus to the moral responsibility logic that lies behind traditional
immutability theory. They can therefore be more persuasive both to courts
and public opinion.

